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The Application in United States Courts
of the Public Policy Provision of the
Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
H kan Berglin*
I. Introduction
Fifteen years have elapsed since the United States acceded to
the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards (Convention or New York Convention).'
The Convention was the culmination of attempts made since the
early 1950's to negotiate a multi-lateral solution to the problems sur-
rounding the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards - a solution it
was hoped would be more effective than that provided by the earlier
Geneva treaties.
2
The Unites States was not a party to the Geneva treaties, nor
did the United States sign the Convention when it was opened for
signature in 1958.' A substantial movement in favor of accession to
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I. June 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Convention]. The
United States implementing legislation is embodied in 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08 (1970). The acces-
sion was made with the reservations that the United States would apply the Convention only to
awards made in the territory of another contracting state and only to differences arising out of
legal relationships which were "considered as commercial under the national law of the United
States." 21 U.S.T. 2566, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 38.
2. The Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses, Sept. 24, 1923, 27 L.N.T.S. 157; Ge-
neva Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Sept. 26, 1927, 92 L.N.T.S.
301. The Geneva treaties generally seem to have been considered by commentators as a fail-
ure. See, e.g., Contini, International Commercial Arbitration, The United Nations Convention
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 8 AM. J. COMP. L. 283, 289
(1959) [hereinafter cited as Contini]; Quigley, Accession by the United States to the United
Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 70
YALE L.J. 1049, 1054 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Quigley].
3. For a list of the reasons explaining why the United States did not sign the Conven-
tion, see Aksen, American Arbitration Accession Arrives in the Age of Aquarius: United
States Implements United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of For-
eign Arbitral Awards, 3 Sw. U.L. REV. I, 4 (1971); Mirabito, The United Nations Convention
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the Convention emerged in the United States in the late 1950's and
early 1960's, 4 however, and the Johnson Administration ultimately
urged the Senate in 1968 to consent to accession.6 Once the neces-
sary implementing legislation was enacted,' the United States depos-
ited the instrument of accession with the Secretary-General of the
United Nations on September 30, 1970.1
The Convention provides for the recognition and enforcement of
foreign arbitral awards,8 and enumerates the grounds on which en-
forcement may be refused. 9 One of these grounds provides that en-
forcement of the award will be refused if such enforcement "would
be contrary to the public policy" of the country in which enforce-
ment is sought. 10 The legislative history gives little guidance as to
the interpretation of this public policy provision,11 and the provision
was early considered by commentators as the strongest impediment
to widespread enforcement of foreign awards."
Although the case law regarding the interpretation of the public
policy defense still is sparse, United States courts undoubtedly have
expressed a willingness to construe the provision narrowly. Thus, it
has been said that a foreign award made in accordance with the
Convention is "treated much like a judgment under the Full Faith
and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution," 3 and that en-
forcement should be denied "only where enforcement would violate
the forum state's most basic notions of morality and justice." 4
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards: The First Four Years, 5
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 471, 486 (1975); Quigley, supra note 2, at 1074-75 n.108.
4. See, e.g., S. EXEC. Doc. No. E, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-15, 27-44 (1968) [hereinaf-
ter cited as S. EXEC. Doc. No. E.].
5. Id. at I.
6. 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08 (1970).
7. 21 U.S.T. 2566 (1970).
8. Convention, supra note 1, at Art. Ill.
9. Id. at Art. V.
10. Id. at Art. V(2)(b).
I1. For a brief explanation of the legislative history, see Contini, supra note 2, at 304;
Quigley, supra note 2, at 1070-71. See also infra note 102.
12. See, e.g., Wilner, Determining the Law Governing Performance in International
Commercial Arbitration, A Comparative Study, 19 RUTGERS L. REv. 646, 668 (1965); Com-
ment, The Public Policy Defense to Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, 7 CAL. WEST. L.J. 228 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Comment].
13. In re Fotochrome Inc., 377 F. Supp. 26, 30 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) affd sub. nom.
Fotochrome, Inc. v. Copal Co., 517 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1975). For the facts of this case see
infra text accompanying notes 17-23.
14. Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. Inc. v. Societe Generale de L'lndustrie du
Papier (RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969, 974 (2d Cir. 1974) (dealing with a conflict between the pro-
arbitration policy of the Convention and the contrary interests of United States foreign policy).
See also Fotochrome, 517 F.2d at 516; Artco Shipping Co. v. Sidermar S.p.A., 417 F. Supp.
207, 216 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), affid mem. 553 F.2d 93 (2d Cir. 1977) (dealing also with a conflict
between the pro-arbitration policy of the Convention and the contrary interests of United
States foreign policy); Laminoirs-Trefileries-Cableries de Lens, S.A. v. Southwire Co., 484 F.
Supp. 1063, 1068 (N.Ga. 1980) (involving public policy against the enforcement of penal pro-
visions in an arbitration agreement and award in a civil code); Biotronik Mess-und Ther-
apiegeraete GmbH & Co. v. Medford Medical Instrument Co., 415 F. Supp. 133, 140 (D.N.J.
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In analyzing the cases decided thus far, commentators generally
have read the decisions as persuasive evidence for a very narrow con-
struction of the public policy provision. '5 In fact, it has been said by
some that "the courts have given the public policy defense so narrow
a construction that it now must be characterized as a defense with-
out meaningful definition [and consequently leaves] the defense
pragmatically useless if not altogether nonexistent."' 6
Although the United States federal courts' decisions can admit-
tedly be read as precedents for a narrow construction of the Conven-
tion's public policy provision, it is also possible to interpret them as
being confined to the particular facts in each case. The limited scope
of the holdings and the courts' explicit and implicit suggestions as to
possible future uses of the public policy defense indicate that under
different fact situations the courts may not construe the Convention's
public policy provision as restrictively.
It will be the purpose of this article to analyze some of the cases
decided to date and, in particular, to emphasize the possible confine-
ment of these cases to their facts. As will be seen, this will lead to
the conclusion that while the courts have undoubtedly indicated a
narrow construction of the public policy defense, the facts of the
cases have hardly presented a real test of how far the courts are
prepared to go in enforcing foreign arbitral awards in situations
where such enforcement would be in substantial conflict with funda-
mental domestic legal or moral concepts or with statutes embodying
such concepts. To phrase it in another way: while the courts have
construed the notion of "public policy" as corresponding to "the
most basic notions of morality and justice," there are still many is-
sues to be decided before it can be authoritatively concluded what
the courts ultimately will consider to be these most basic notions of
morality and justice.
1976) (where it was alleged an arbitration award was fraudulently obtained therefore render-
ing it contrary to the public policy of the forum country).
I5. See, e.g., Ehrenhaft, Effective International Commercial Arbitration, 9 L. & POL
INT'L Bus. 1191 (1977); Harnik, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
31 AM. J. COMP. L. 703 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Harnik]; Comment, supra note 12, at 228;
Note, Judicial Interpretations of Foreign Arbitral Awards Under the U.N. Convention, 8 L. &
POL. INT'L Bus. 737 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Note]; Note, The Recognition and Enforce-
ment of Foreign Country Judgments and Arbitral Awards: A North-South Perspective, I I
GA. J. INT. & CoMP. L. 635 (1981). See also RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 498 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1983).
16. Comment, supra note 12, at 245. See also Harnik, supra note 15, at 704. Harnik
concludes that the courts have "built a bastion against the public policy defense" and that "it
is becoming more and more apparent that our courts . . . will reject, wherever possible, public
policy defenses. Note, supra note 15, at 747-48. Herein the author thinks that such severe
limitations have been placed on the public policy defense that "it is possible that the only
major area in which [it] might still be applicable is that of claims involving antitrust
violations."
Spring 19861
DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
1I. Analysis of Cases
Except for a few rather specific situations that will be addressed
at the end of this article, most of the cases where the public policy
defense has been invoked have involved what might be broadly de-
scribed as at least a potential conflict between the pro-enforcement
policy of the Convention and a domestic governmental policy, fre-
quently represented by a federal legislative act. To date every such
conflict has been solved in favor of the Convention.
In Re Fotochrome7 presented a potential conflict between the
Convention policy favoring enforcement of foreign awards and the
policy of the United States Bankruptcy Act18 of insuring equal treat-
ment of creditors. Therein, a dispute arose out of a contract between
a New York and a Japanese corporation. In accordance with a provi-
sion of the contract, the dispute was referred to arbitration in Japan.
In the course of the arbitration proceedings, the New York corpora-
tion filed for an arrangement under chapter XI of the Bankruptcy
Act 9 in New York. Soon thereafter, the federal bankruptcy judge
issued an order staying all proceedings by creditors, including pend-
ing arbitrations. Notwithstanding this order, the arbitration pro-
ceeded, and an award was rendered in favor of the Japanese corpora-
tion. Judgment was entered on the award in Japan, and the award
was filed in the bankruptcy proceedings as proof of claim. The bank-
ruptcy judge ruled that because of his restraining order, he was not
bound by the decision of the arbitrators, but had power to reconsider
the merits of the underlying dispute. By holding that the bankruptcy
judge lacked jurisdiction over the Japanese corporation, and in rec-
ognizing that under both the Treaty with Japan on Friendship, Com-
merce and Navigation20 and the Convention21 the award was to be
granted the same finality in the United States courts as it had been
allowed in the Japanese courts, the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of New York reversed the ruling of the bank-
ruptcy judge.22 The decision of the District Court was affirmed by
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. 3
Although technically the District Court and Court of Appeals
were not faced with the question of enforcing the award,2" they
17. 377 F. Supp. 26 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd sub. nom. Fotochrome Inc. v. Copal Co.,
517 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1975).
18. II U.S.C.A. §§ 101 (West 1979).
19. Id. at 1101.
20. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Apr. 2, 1953, United States-Ja-
pan, 4 US.T. 2063, T.I.A.S. No. 2863.
21. Convention, supra note I.
22. In Re Fotochrome, 377 F. Supp. 26, 32 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd sub. nom.
Fotochrome Inc. v. Copal Co., 517 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1975).
23. Id.
24. The ruling of the bankruptcy judge was reversed in order to give the Japanese
[Vol. 4:2
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clearly expressed a strong policy in favor of international arbitration
and a narrow construction of the public policy provision.25 The hold-
ings, however, were clearly based on narrow jurisdictional grounds.
Both courts reached the conclusion that the bankruptcy judge lacked
personal jurisdiction over the Japanese corporation and that there-
fore the order to stay the arbitration proceedings did not operate
against it.2
The two courts did differ on their approach to one particular
issue, however. While the opinion of the District Court might well be
read as going beyond the jurisdictional limitations question and cov-
ering also a real conflict between the Convention and the policy un-
derlying the Bankruptcy Act, the Court of Appeals explicitly limited
the scope of its holding to the jurisdictional facts. Thus, after having
dealt with the question of the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy judge,
the District Court went on to discuss the impact of the Treaty of
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation and the Convention, saying
inter alia:
Recognition of. . .foreign. . . awards are mandated under the
[Convention]. They are treated much like a judgment under the
Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution
... .The two treaties compel us to grant the same finality to
the award . . . as it has been allowed in Japanese courts ....
American corporations facing imminently unfavorable arbitra-
tions abroad may not file for Chapter XI arrangements here to
avoid final and binding arbitral judgment abroad . . . .Inter-
national commerce has grown too large and the world too small
for American courts to disregard the law of nations, even in
favor of the Bankruptcy Act.27
The Court of Appeals, on the other hand, explicitly pointed out that
the case could be decided "without the necessity of determining
whether the Bankruptcy Act [involved] a 'public policy' which [was]
contrary to enforcement of arbitral awards under the Convention."2
The Second Circuit therefore avoided the public policy issue it would
have had to decide had the bankruptcy judge had jurisdiction over
corporation an opportunity to seek confirmation of the award in the United States. Id. at 519-
20.
25. The district court thought that foreign awards in the Convention were "treated
much like a judgment under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitu-
tion." In Re Fotochrome, 377 F. Supp. at 30. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in citing
Parsons & Whittemore, Overseas Co. v. Societe Geherale de L'Industrie du Papier (RATKA),
508 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974), stated that the public policy provision of the Convention should
be applied "only where enforcement would violate the forum state's most basic notions of
morality and justice." Fotochrome, 517 F.2d at 516.
26. In Re Fotochrome, 377 F. Supp. at 29, 517 F.2d at 516.
27. In Re Fotochrome, 377 F. Supp. at 30, 32.
28. Fotochrome, 517 F.2d at 516.
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the Japanese corporation.29
Admittedly, the differences in the courts' opinions might be in-
cidental. On the other hand, there is nothing that contradicts an as-
sumption that the Court of Appeals thought that the District Court
had gone too far in its seemingly unreserved indication of the
supremacy of the Convention over the Bankruptcy Act and, there-
fore, felt compelled to underscore the limited scope of its own deci-
sion. Be that as it may, it still remains to be seen whether a foreign
award would be enforced in a situation where enforcement would be
in direct and substantial conflict with the policies underlying the
Bankruptcy Act.
Being the only case decided by the United States Supreme
Court in which questions of public policy were involved, Scherk v.
Alberto-Culver Co.5 0 naturally is of particular interest. Under the
contract involved in the case, an American manufacturer purchased
from a German citizen three enterprises organized under the laws of
Germany and Liechtenstein together with all the trademark rights of
those enterprises. The sales contract, which was negotiated in the
United States as well as abroad and was signed and closed abroad,
contained express warranties that the trademarks were unencum-
bered. The contract also contained an arbitration clause providing
for arbitration in Paris. After allegedly discovering that the trade-
29. Id. at 520. In explaining the anomaly that a foreign award should be accorded
more respect than its American counterpart, the District Court said:
The anomaly can be explained by the force of the Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution. A treaty, under that clause, is the 'supreme' law of the land ....
Here the . . . Treaty with Japan and the . . . Convention have superseded in
small measure the . . . Bankruptcy law.
In re Fotochrome, 377 F.Supp. at 30-31. In explaining the same anomaly, the Court of Ap-
peals said:
The result is not quite as anomalous as appears, however. For in a converse
situation an American company might procure an arbitral award in the United
States against a Japanese firm in financial trouble whose Japanese creditors
might be under a stay from a Japanese court.
Fotochrome, 517 F.2d at 519-20.
30. 417 U.S. 506 (1974). Subsequent to the completion of this article, the Supreme
Court had decided the case of Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 105
S. Ct. 3346 (1985). This case also concerned the enforcement of an arbitration clause in the
context of an international transaction. The principle issue in the case was the arbitrability,
pursuant to the Federal Aribration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14, and the Convention of claims aris-
ing under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7, and encompassed within a valid contractual
arbitration clause.
Although enforcing the arbitral agreement, the Court, as in the Scherk case, left a num-
ber of questions unanswered and also indicated and even explicitly pointed out a number of
situations which would raise issues that were not present in this case. In particular, the Court
observed that under the public policy provision of the Convention "the national courts of the
United States [would] have the opportunity at the award enforcement stage to ensure that the
legitimate interest in the enforcement of the antitrust laws [had] been addressed." 105 S.Ct. at
3360. In short, the Mitsubishi decision throws no further light on the question of how far
United States courts will ultimately be willing to go in enforcing foreign arbitral awards in
situations where such enforcement would be in substantial conflict with vital domestic
interests.
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marks were subject to encumbrances, the buyer brought suit in the
United States contending that the fraudulent representations con-
cerning the trademark rights violated Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 193431 and Rule lOb-5 promulgated thereunder.32
The seller invoked the arbitration clause in a motion to stay the ac-
tion pending arbitration. Based on a finding that the transaction in
issue involved securities within the purview of Regulation lOb-5, and
in relying on the Supreme Court's decision in an earlier case, Wilko
v. Swan,33 the District Court and the Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit denied the motion. 4 In considering the "truly interna-
tional" character of the underlying contract as the factor distin-
guishing the Scherk case from Wilko, the Supreme Court in Scherk,
in a close five to four decision, reversed and held enforceable the
agreement to arbitrate.3 5
Despite the apparently strong bias in favor of arbitration of in-
ternational disputes, the Supreme Court's holding in Scherk is in
several ways limited. First, the Court particularly emphasized the
significantly international character of the underlying contract, and
pointed out that the only contacts with the United States were the
fact that the buyer was an American corporation and that "some -
but by no means the greater part - of the pre-contract negotia-
tions" occurred in this country."6 The Court even explicitly stated
that another outcome would be feasible in a situation where the con-
tacts with foreign countries were less significant: "Concededly, situa-
tions may arise where the contacts with foreign countries are so in-
significant or attenuated that the holding in Wilko would
meaningfully apply. Judicial response to such situations can and
should await future litigation in concrete cases." 37
31. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
32. 17 C.F.R. § 240, (1985) (Rule lOb-5).
33. 346 U.S. 427 (1953). Wilko was an entirely domestic action brought by a customer
against a securities brokerage firm to recover damages under the civil liabilities provisions of §
12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1981), for alleged misrepresentation
in the sales of securities. Under the Act, any "stipulation" waiving compliance with any "pro-
vision" of the act is void. Id. at § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 77n. The United States Supreme Court, in
declining to enforce an invoked agreement to arbitrate, held that the arrangement to arbitrate
was such a "stipulation" and that the right to select the judicial forum was the kind of "provi-
sion" that could not be waived under the Act. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 434-35.
34. See Alberto-Culver Co. v. Scherk, 484 F.2d 611 (7th Cir. 1973).
35. As to the "truly international agreement" the Court said:
Such a contract involves considerations and policies significantly different from
those found controlling in Wilko .... The invalidation of such an agreement in
the case before us would not only allow the respondent to repudiate its solemn
promise but would, as well, reflect a parochial concept that all disputes must be
resolved under our laws and in our courts .... We cannot have trade and
commerce in world markets ... exclusively on our terms, governed by our laws,
and resolved in our courts.
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 515, 519 (1974).
36. Id. at 515, 517 n.ll.
37. Id. at 517 n.1 1. See supra note 33.
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Second, since the Court disposed of the case on other grounds, it
did not consider a contention that the holding of Wilko should be
limited to situations where the parties exhibit a disparity of bargain-
ing power.38 The decision in Wilko was based in part on the assump-
tion that the 1933 Securities Act was enacted to protect relatively
uninformed, individual investors when dealing with more sophisti-
cated and well-informed issuers of and dealers in securities. 39 While
there seems to be no reason to believe that such a protection would
have been considered necessary in Scherk,10 situations might well
arise where the motives underlying the 1934 Securities Exchange
Act as compared to the policy favoring arbitration would have to be
given considerably more weight than in Scherk.
4 1
The third way in which the Scherk decision is limited is illus-
trated by the fact that the Supreme Court's holding did not involve a
finding of a violation of the securities laws or even, as opposed to the
decision in the lower courts, that the transaction in question was a
security transaction within the meaning of those laws. To the con-
trary, the Court explicitly pointed out the absence of these issues:
Our decision . . has no bearing on the scope of the substantive
provisions of the federal securities laws . . . . We do not reach,
or imply any opinion as to, the question whether the acquisition
of Scherk's business was a security transaction . . . Although
this important question was considered by the District Court
and the Court of Appeals, and although the dissenting opinion
. . . seems to consider it controlling, the petitioner did not as-
sign the adverse ruling on the question as error and it was not
briefed and argued in this court.
42
Consequently the Court found no reason to address the policies un-
38. Id. at 512-13 n.6.
39. 346 U.S. at 435. The Wilko Court stated:
[It] is clear that the Securities Act was drafted with an eye to the
disadvantages under which buyers labor. Issuers of and dealers in securities have
better opportunities to investigate and appraise the prospective earnings and bus-
iness plans affecting securities than buyers . . . . When the security buyer...
waives his right to sue in courts, he gives up more than would a. participant in
other business transactions.
The contract in Wilko was concluded between a private customer and a securities broker-
age firm, and the arbitration clause was contained in a standard form margin contract. Id. at
428-29.
40. The buyer in Scherk was an American corporation doing business in the United
States as well as abroad. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 508. The contract was said to have been negoti-
ated over a number of years by knowledgeable and sophisticated business and legal experts. Id.
at 513 n.6.
41. See also Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion in Alberto-Culver, 484 F.2d at 617,
when dealing with situations where "quite obviously the rationale of Wilko . . . would pre-
clude the enforceability," and concluding: "For in such situations the same kind of disparity in
either information or bargaining power is likely to be present, and there is no more reason to
favor arbitration than in disputes arising under the 1933 Act."
42. See Scherk, 417 U.S. at 518 n.12, 415 n.8.
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derlying the securities regulations or to speculate on their interaction
with the public policy provision of the Convention. Without sug-
gesting any conclusion, it might be pointed out that the narrow, not
to say dubious, procedural reasons given for not addressing what had
been one of the key issues in the courts below"' seem to be all but
convincing,4 particularly since questions of public policy undoubt-
edly may be taken into consideration irrespective of whether raised
by the parties or not.
4 5
Fourth, the Scherk case presented the question of the enforce-
ment of an agreement to arbitrate rather than enforcement of an
award rendered under such an agreement. While historically the
courts seem to have been more favorable to enforcement of awards
than agreements to arbitrate,"' the Court in Scherk seems to suggest
that although it enforced the agreement to arbitrate, the circum-
stances presented might well be sufficient to render an award unen-
forceable under the Convention's public policy provision: "Although
we do not decide the question, presumably the type of fraud alleged
here could be raised, under Art. V of the Convention . . ., in chal-
lenging the enforcement of whatever arbitral award is produced
through arbitration.
4 7
As for the final limitation, although the decision was not based
on this fact, the Court at the outset pointed out the possibility of
distinguishing Scherk from Wilko by the difference in the protection
for investors provided for in the 1933 Securities Act as compared to
the 1934 Securities Exchange Act."" The Court pointed out that the
''special right" of a private remedy for a civil liability contained in
the 1933 Act and which the Court in Wilko had found significant,
had no statutory counterpart in the 1934 Act. 9 Also, certain of the
"provisions" of the 1933 Act which the Court in Wilko had held
43. See Alberto-Culver, 484 F.2d at 615.
44. See also Justice Douglas' dissenting opinion in Scherk, 417 U.S. at 525.
45. See Convention, supra note I, at arts. 11(3) and V(2) as compared to art. V(I),
under which enforcement may be refused at the request of the party against whom an award is
invoked.
46. See, e.g., N.P. Sloan Co. v. Standard Chemical & Oil Co. 256 F. 451 (5th Cir.
1918); Crumlish v. Wilmington & W.R. Co., 5 Del. Ch. 270 (1879); Fenster v. Makovsky, 67
So.2d 427 (Fla. 1953); Grant Alexander & Co. v. The Savannah Griffin and North Alabama
Railroad Co.. 51 Ga. 349 (1874); Carter v. Carter, 109 Mass. 306 (1872); Skinner v. Gaither
Co., 234 N.C. 385 (1951). See also, e.g., Heilman, The Enforceability of Foreign Awards in
the United States, 3 ARB. J. 183"(1939); STURGES, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND AWARDS
57 (1930).
47. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 519 n.14.
48. Id. at 513.
49. Id. Section 12(2) of the 1933 Act provides a defrauded purchaser with a special
right to recover for misrepresentation which differs substantially from the common law action
in that under the Act the seller is made to assume the burden of proving lack of scienter.
Wilko, 346 U.S. at 431. The 1934 Act, on the other hand, does not in itself establish such a
"special right," although courts have construed it as creating an implied cause of action.
Scherk, 417 U.S. at 513-14.
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could not be waived were not contained in the 1934 Act. 50
Scherk has been said to set a precedent for a narrow construc-
tion of the public policy defense. 5' This position might be well taken
in view of the fact that the Court, although not basing its decision on
the Convention,52 undoubtedly expressed a strong policy in favor of
arbitration and also clearly recognized the particular considerations
and policies involved in what the Court described as truly interna-
tional agreements. 3 However, as has been seen, almost every crucial
set of facts to be considered in determining the question of enforce-
ment in this case occurred in a configuration clearly favoring en-
forcement. In addition, a number of questions obviously were left
unanswered by the Court.5 4 It is therefore arguable that the facts in
Scherk did not present a real test of how narrow a construction of
the public policy provision the Court would have been willing to
adopt and that this can be clarified only by awaiting further and
more severe tests.
In Antco Shipping55 and Parsons & Whittemore" the question
of public policy was raised on the ground that enforcement of the
agreement to arbitrate and arbitration award, respectively, would
have been contrary to United States foreign policy considerations.
Antco Shipping was an action brought to enforce an agreement to
arbitrate. The agreement was contained in a contract for ocean car-
riage of petroleum products from Mediterranean ports, "excluding
Israel. ' 57 The enforcement was challenged on the ground, inter alia,
that the exclusion of Israeli loading ports was a boycott or blacklist
of Israel, a nation friendly to the United States, and therefore a vio-
lation of the public policy of the United States as expressed in the
Export Regulation Act 58 and the regulations promulgated thereun-
50. In particular, the Court noted that while the jurisdictional provisions of the 1933
Act allowed a plaintiff to bring suit in any federal or state court of competent jurisdiction, the
1934 Act provided for suit only in the federal district court that had "exclusive jurisdiction,"
thus "significantly restricting the plaintiffs choice of forum." Scherk, 417 U.S. at 514.
51. See, e.g., Ehrenhaft, supra note 15, at 1215; Note, supra note 15, at 742, 748;
Comment, supra note 12, at 246, where it is said that in light of the Scherk decision "even
where a foreign arbitral award directly discourages a party from complying with domestic
statutes, . . . the public policy defense will not prevent enforcement," and that "it will be
difficult . . . to anticipate the limits on unfairness surrounding international commercial arbi-
tration." But see, e.g., Dunham/Schuster, Recent Developments, 5 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
257, 263 (1975); Comment, Greater Certainty in International Transactions Through Choices
of Forum, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 366, 371, 374 (1975).
52. The Court, while not reaching the issue of whether enforcement would have been
required under the Convention, thought that the United States accession to the Convention
provided "strongly persuasive evidence of congressional policy consistent with" the decision in
this case. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 520 n.15.
53. Id. at 515.
54. See supra text accompanying notes 38, 42 and 47.
55. 417 F. Supp. 207 (1976).
56. 508 F.2d 969.
57. 417 F. Supp. at 209.
58. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2401 (1984).
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der. 59 The Congressional declaration of policy underlying the Export
Regulation Act is set forth in Section 2402. Particular reliance was
placed upon Section 2402(5), which reads in part: "It is the policy of
the United States . . . to oppose restrictive trade practices or boy-
cotts fostered or imposed by foreign countries against other countries
friendly to the United States ... .60 In recognizing that the public
policy provision of the Convention required a narrow construction,
the court had no difficulty in reaching the conclusion that the agree-
ment to arbitrate was entitled to enforcement.61 However, and even
if the court in dicta suggests that violations of the Export Regulation
Act would bar enforcement only in cases where performance is ex-
pressly forbidden under the Act,"2 the holding is based narrowly on
the particular facts of the case. The court found and explicitly based
its decision on the fact that the policy expressed in the Act related
solely to exports from the United States and that the contract in
question did not involve exports "in any meaningful sense."63 In
other words, the court did not reach the issue of a direct and signifi-
cant conflict between the policy favoring arbitration and the policy
under the Act of non-participation in trade restrictions or boycotts
imposed by other countries on countries friendly with the United
States. Furthermore, none of the parties were American citizens and
the only relation with the United States seems to have been the mere
fact that the charterer had been given an option to use one or two
American ports as an alternative to Caribbean discharging ports.64
Finally, since the decision was based on the fact that the contract
did not involve exports from the United States, the court explicitly
avoided the question of whether the provision excluding Israel was
inserted in the contract for the purpose of boycotting or blacklisting
Israel rather than for legitimate safety reasons as alleged by the
59. 15 C.F.R. 369 (1984). It was also alleged that the exclusion of Israeli ports ren-
dered the contract illegal under § 296 of the New York Executive Law, which forbids boycott
or blacklisting because of national origin. As to this allegation, the court said that the applica-
bility of the statute to the contract was not sufficiently demonstrated and that, in any event,
the declaration of policy of the statute had "to yield to the public policy of the United States,
as expressed in the adherence to the Convention." Antco Shipping, 417 F. Supp. at 212, 217.
60. 50 U.S.C. § 2401(5) (1984).
61. Although faced with the question of the enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate
under art. 11(3) of the Convention, supra note 1, rather than an award, the court analyzed the
public policy provision of art. V(2)(b) because the rationale for a narrow construction of this
provision was thought to apply "with equal force to considerations, within the context of en-
forcement of the arbitration agreement itself, of whether the contract in question is 'null and
void' under Art. 11(3) of the Convention." Anico Shipping, 417 F. Supp. at 216.
62. The Court stated: "[Aissuming arguendo that the exclusion in some manner con-
travenes public policy as expressed in the Export Regulation Act, it still falls far short of
entirely forbidding ...performance under the contract." Id. at 215-16.
63. Id. at 213.
64. Art. 5 of the contract read: "Discharging one (1) or two (2) safe port(s) Bahamas
or other Caribbean port(s) excluding Cuba, or at Charterer's option one (1) or two (2) United
States Atlantic Coast." Id. at 210.
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plaintiff Sidermar.6 5
A more explicit distinction between the concept of public policy
under the Convention on one hand, and national foreign political in-
terests on the other, was made by the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals in Parsons & Whittemore.16 An American corporation in the
Parsons & Whittemore case had agreed to construct a paperboard
mill in Egypt. Financial support for the project was to be provided
by the Agency for International Development (AID), a branch of
the United States State Department. Before completion of construc-
tion and with the Arab-Israeli Six Day War on the horizon, the
Egyptian government broke off diplomatic relations with the United
States and ordered all Americans, except those who could apply and
qualify for special visas, expelled from Egypt. As a consequence,
AID withdrew its financial support, and the project was abandoned
by the American company.67 In the ensuing arbitration the company
was held in breach of the contract. In challenging the enforcement of
the award, the American corporation argued that various actions by
United States officials, and most particularly AID's withdrawal of
financial support, required it, as a loyal American citizen, to aban-
don the project. In enforcing the award after tracing the legislative
history of the public policy provision of the Convention and conclud-
ing that enforcement should be denied only "where enforcement
would violate the forum state's most basic notions of morality and
justice,"6 the court made a clear distinction between public policy
and national foreign political interests:
In equating 'national' policy with United States 'public policy,'
the appellant quite plainly misses the mark. To read the public
policy defense as a parochial device protective of national politi-
cal interests would seriously undermine the Convention's utility.
This provision was not meant to enshrine the vagaries of interna-
tional politics under the rubric of 'public policy.' Rather, a cir-
cumscribed public policy doctrine was contemplated by the Con-
vention's framers and every indication is that the United States,
in acceding to the Convention, meant to subscribe to this supra-
national emphasis.6 9
In addition to this obviously plain language, the court, like the court
65. Id. at 213.
66. 508 F.2d 969 (1974).
67. Although not made explicit in the court's opinion in this case, in an account of
Parsons & Whittemore case in Antco Shipping, it is stated that the State Department in-
structed the American company to cease performance of the contract in accordance with the
provisions of 22 U.S.C. § 23701, (q), and (5), which prohibited the furnishing of assistance to
the United Arab Republic subsequent to the cessation of diplomatic relations with that coun-
try. Antco Shipping, 417 F. Supp. at 216.




in Antco Shipping,0 indicated that enforcement would be refused




While the inevitable conclusion to be drawn from the court's
reasoning in Parsons & Whittemore is that enforcement, in princi-
ple, should be granted even where it would conflict with national for-
eign policy interests, the facts presented in the case fell far short of
putting this principle to a real test. Far from being a declared, well-
established congressional policy, the circumstances relied on by the
American corporation were of quite a temporary character.7" The
court also considered the alleged policy conflict incidental rather
than substantial and the outcome of the dispute between the parties
as being of no vital interest to the United States."
The cases dealt with so far have involved what in the beginning
of this article was broadly described as at least a potential conflict
between the pro-enforcement policy of the Convention and a domes-
tic governmental policy frequently represented by a federal legisla-
tive act. Without pretending to be exhaustive, a few more specific
situations will be mentioned in the following portion of this article in
which the public policy defense has been raised, sometimes success-
fully, and also situations in which the defense will most likely con-
tinue to be invoked in the future. Because few cases to date have
dealt with this issue, however, the decisions do not yet indicate any
clear trends. Any positive conclusion as to whether, and if so to what
extent, the public policy provision will be a useful defense in these
situations must still await future judicial decisions.
B. Cases Involving Specific Conflicts
In Laminoirs-Trefileries-Cableries de Lens S.A. v. Southwire
70. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
71. After having concluded that a narrow construction of the public policy defense re-
quired enforcement of the award, the court added: "Moreover, the facts here fail to demon-
strate that considered government policy forbids completion of the contract itself by a private
party." 508 F.2d at 974 n.5.
72. The arbitration tribunal held the non-performance of the American company ex-
cusable on the ground of force majeure for a period of about one month, but felt that for the
time thereafter the corporation "had made no more than a perfunctory effort to secure" the
special visas, necessary for its workers to return to Egypt. 508 F.2d at 972.
73. In disposing of an argument that "United States foreign policy issues" could not be
arbitrated and that, therefore, enforcement should be refused under art. V(2)(a) of the Con-
vention, the court said, inter alia:
The mere fact that an issue of national interest may incidentally figure into the
resolution of a breach of contract claim does not make the dispute not arbitrable
.... Overseas [the corporation] grossly exaggerates the magnitude-of the na-
tional interest involved in the resolution of its particular claim. Simply because
acts of the United States are somehow implicated in a case one cannot conclude
that the United States is vitally interested in its outcome."
Id. at 975.
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Co."' the Federal District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
was faced with the question of enforcing an award which granted, in
addition to compensatory damages, what the court considered to be
punitive damages. 75 The award, arising out of a purchase agreement
between a French manufacturer and a Georgia corporation, provided
for interest on the sum awarded to rates of ten and a half percent
and nine and a half percent (depending upon the date of maturity of
an underpaid invoice), "increasing to fifteen and a half percent and
fourteen and a half percent respectively after two months from the
date of notification of the award. ' 76 The imposition of the additional
five percent interest seems to have been in accordance with French
law, which was applied by the arbitrators.77 While recognizing that
the public policy provision of the Convention should be applied only
"where enforcement would violate the forum country's most basic
notions of morality and justice,' 78 the United States District Court
concluded that the imposition of the additional five percent interest
was "penal rather than compensatory" and bore "no reasonable rela-
tion to any damage resulting from delay in recovery," and that
therefore that portion of the award could not be enforced.79
In view of the strong language in favor of the enforcement of
foreign awards contained in virtually every judicial decision subse-
quent to the United States accession to the Convention,80 the out-
come in Laminoirs is somewhat surprising. Admittedly, it might be
argued that the court indicated a well-defined and recognized princi-
ple in support of its decision by holding that the additional five per-
cent interest awarded in accordance with French law was penal in
nature and that "a foreign law [would] not be enforced if it [were]
penal only and [related] to the punishing of public wrongs as contra-
distinguished from the redressing of private injuries."81 However,
this argument does not seem to be convincing since the provision on
74. 484 F. Supp. 1063 (1980).
75. It seems to be a well-settled rule that punitive damages are not recoverable in ac-
tions for breach of contract, even if agreed upon between the parties; see, e.g., Steffen v.
United States, 213 F.2d 266 (6th Cir. 1954); Kerr v. Port Huron Sulphite and Paper Co., 157
F. Supp. 685 (D.N.J. 1957); Ward v. Hudston River Building Co., 125 N.Y. 230 (1891); see
also 25 C.J.S. Damages §§ 101, 120 (1966); 22 Am. Jur. 2d Damages §§ 232, 245 (1965). As
a consequence of this policy, domestic arbitral awards granting punitive damages have been
refused enforcement for reasons elaborately stated in Publishers' Association v. Newspaper
and Mail Deliverers' Union, 280 A.D. 500, 114 N.Y.S.2d 401 (N.Y. App. Div. 1952). See
also East India Trading Co. v. Dada Haji Ebrahim Halari, 280 A.D. 420 (N.Y. App. Div.
1952).
76. Laminoirs, 484 F. Supp. at 1068.
77. Id. at 1069.
78. Id. at 1068.
79. Id. at 1069.
80. The United States acceded to the Convention in 1968. See supra note I and ac-
companying text.
81. Laminoirs, 484 F.Supp. at 1069.
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interest rates seems to have been applied only as a result of the inter-
pretation given by the arbitrators to a contractual choice of law
clause agreed upon between the parties."2 Furthermore, the court in
dicta explicitly stated that "agreements to pay fixed sums as dam-
ages plainly without reasonable relation to any probable damage
which may follow [would] not be enforced."83 Whatever the true
motives underlying the decision might have been, the court in Lami-
noirs must have found them significant enough to place them within
the category of "the most basic notions of morality and justice."
A policy favoring arbitration and making every presumption in
favor of the validity of a duly rendered award necessarily must be
founded on an assumption that the award is unaffected by any inap-
propriate behavior of the parties and constitutes the honest judgment
of the arbitrators. Consequently, it seems to have been generally rec-
ognized that domestic awards should be set aside when procured or
influenced by the fraud or misconduct of a party,84 or when one or
more of the arbitrators were guilty of fraud, misconduct, corruption,
or partiality. 85 In view of the obvious significance of the rationales
underlying this policy, it seems quite likely that they would apply
with considerable force also to considerations of whether enforce-
ment of a foreign award would be against public policy.8"
The only case in which misbehavior of this kind was asserted to
be a proper defense under the public policy provision of the Conven-
tion is Biotronik Mess.8 7 Since the court found that the alleged be-
82. The purchase agreement between the parties contained a governing law clause stat-
ing that the agreement was to be governed by Georgia law to the extent that it was in accor-
dance with French law. Id. at 1067.
83. Id. at 1069.
84. Under the Federal Arbitration Act, one of the grounds on which an award may be
set aside is "where the award was procured by corruption, fraud or undue means," 9 U.S.C. §
10(a) (1970). Most state statutes contain identical or similar provisions, see, e.g., CAL. CIv.
PROC. CODE § 1286.2 (West 1982); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 645.9 (1948); 1923 N.J. Laws 134,
§ 9; NEW YORK Civ. PRAC. LAW § 1457 (Consol. 1921). As to judicial decisions, see, e.g.,
Smith v. Home Inc., 178 S.C. 436, 183 S.E. 166 (1936); see also 6 C.J.S. Arbitration § 152
(1975); 5 Am. Jur. 2d Arbitration and Award § 175 (1962).
85. Under the Federal Arbitration Act, one of the grounds on which an award may be
set aside is "where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of
them," 9 U.S.C. § 10(b) (1970). Most state statutes contain identical or similar provisions; see
e.g., supra note 84. As to judicial decisions, see e.g., Tejas Development Co. v. McGough
Bros., 165 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1947); Twin Lakes Reservoir & Canal Co. v. Platt Rogers Inc.,
105 Colo. 49, 94 P.2d 1090 (1939); Skinner v. Smith, 120 Ga. App. 35, 169 S.E.2d 365
(1969); see also 6 C.J.S. Arbitration § 153 (1975); 5 Am. Jur. 2d Arbitration and Award §§
173, 177 (1962).
86. Misbehavior of the kind involved here might well be such as to make applicable one
or more of the more specific provisions of art. V(I) of the Convention, under which enforce-
ment may be refused. Nevertheless, due to the relatively limited scope of these provisions,
situations might easily be imagined where the only possible provision under which enforcement
could be denied would be the public policy clause.
87. 415 F. Supp. 133. The contention of fraud was based on the alleged fact that Bio-
tronik, when it appeared alone at the arbitration hearing, knowingly withheld certain evidence
in a calculated attempt to mislead the arbitrators. Id. at 137.
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havior did not constitute fraud, it did not express any opinion as to
whether the public policy provision would have been applicable had
the award been affected by inappropriate behavior of substantial
character.88 Nevertheless, by disposing of the defense on the ground
that fraud was not shown rather than on an assumption that such
fraud would not have been an effective defense under the public pol-
icy provision, 89 the court, if not expressly indicating an answer in the
affirmative, at least left unanswered the question of whether fraud
should be a proper defense under the public policy provision. Other
courts, although not faced with this precise issue, have stated that
this kind of misbehavior or bias might render unenforceable agree-
ments to arbitrate disputes arising out of international commercial
transactions as well as awards rendered under such agreements. 90
Finally, still another situation will briefly be pointed out in
which further judicial decisions are necessary in order to clarify
whether, and if so to what extent, the public policy provision would
be a proper defense against the enforcement of foreign awards. The
situation arises when, under the law where enforcement is sought,
the underlying agreement would be on an entirely illegal subject
matter or would require for its completion the performance of an
illegal act. To the extent the pertinent law would reflect a well-estab-
lished national policy, nothing needs to be added to what already has
been discussed above. However, since a state penal statute, for exam-
ple, does not necessarily reflect such a policy, the question of illegal-
ity as a defense against enforcement of a foreign arbitral award re-
quires further consideration.
As to purely domestic awards, enforcement generally has been
denied when rendered upon submission to arbitration of claims aris-
ing out of illegal transactions.9" No case has been decided subse-
quent to the United States accession to the Convention in which the
enforcement of a foreign award has been denied on the basis of ille-
88. Id. at 140.
89. The Court stated: "[B]ecause Medford has been unable to establish fraud ... the
public policy defense of Article V of the Convention is a fortiori inapplicable . . . . Since the
court did not find fraud . . . it is distinctly incapable of finding that the award violated our
'most basic notions of morality and justice.'" Id. at 140.
90. In Scherk, the United States Supreme Court said that "an arbitration or forum-
selection clause in a contract is not enforceable if the inclusion of that clause in the contract
was the product of fraud or coercion." 417 U.S. at 519 n.14. In Landegger v. Bayerische
Hypotheken and Wechsel Bank, 357 F. Supp. 692 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) the District Court said
that a defendant would be permitted to invoke, "as a defense to an enforcement action on a
foreign arbitration award, any of the grounds for vacating an award of arbitrators provided for
in New York," including "corruption, fraud or misconduct in procuring the award," and "par-
tiality of an arbitrator appointed as a neutral." Id. at 695.
91. See, e.g., Franklin v. Goldstone Agency, 33 Cal.2d 628, 188 P.2d 60 (1949); Lov-
ing & Evans v. Blick, 33 Cal.2d 603, 191 P.2d 445 (1949); Benton & Brother v. Singleton,
114 Ga. 548, 40 S.E. 738 (1902); Exercycle Co. v. Maratta, 9 N.Y.2d 329, 174 N.E.2d 463,
214 N.Y.S.2d 353 (1961).
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gality in the underlying agreement or its performance. The defense
was invoked against the enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate in
Antco Shipping"2 on the ground that the underlying contract was
allegedly illegal under New York law. 93 Since the court did not find
the statute in question applicable to the contract, it did not reach the
issue of illegality. However, in reviewing earlier New York law on
the point, the court found, as to agreements to arbitrate, that non-
enforcement has been limited "to the situation in which public policy
as embodied in a statute forbids the performance which is the sub-
ject of dispute."94 Furthermore, the court explicitly recognized that
the phrase "null and void" contained in Article 11(3) of the Conven-
tion, "opens the door to an argument of nonenforcement based on
illegality," 95 although it construed the phrase to "require a showing
.. .that the essence of the obligation . . . is prohibited by a perti-
nent statute or other declaration of public policy."" In light of this
analysis the court finally stated that even if the New York statute
invoked had been found applicable, the statute would have had to
"yield to the public policy of the United States, as expressed in the
adherence to the Convention." '97 Even though the'court was faced
with the question of enforcing an agreement to arbitrate rather than
an award, it was of the opinion that the two situations would present
"comparable questions of public policy." 98
In summary, and as the court in Antco Shipping explicitly rec-
ognized, 99 the door is undoubtedly open to an argument for non-en-
forcement based on illegality. However, in view of the analysis made
in this case, and the frequently reiterated reference of the court in
Parsons & Whittemore to the "most basic notions of morality and
justice,"' 00 illegality would most likely have to be significant in char-
acter in order to bar enforcement.
III. Conclusion
By repeatedly declaring that enforcement should be denied only
where enforcement would violate the "most basic notions of morality
and justice,"'' United States federal courts undoubtedly have indi-
cated a firm willingness to give the public policy provision of the
92. 417 F. Supp. 207.
93. For the facts of the case, see supra text accompanying notes 55-59; as to the al-
leged illegality under the New York law, see supra note 59.
94. 417 F. Supp. at 215.
95. Id.
96. id.
97. Id. at 217.
98. Id. at 216. See also supra note 61.
99. 417 F.Supp. at 215.
100. Parsons & Whittemore, 508 F.2d at 974.
101. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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New York Convention the narrow construction that seems to have
been intended by its framers. In fact, it is striking to note the simi-
larity between this phrase and the one employed by the Ad Hoc
Committee of the Economic and Social Council of the United Na-
tions during the preparatory work for the Convention when declaring
its intent to limit the application of the public policy clause to situa-
tions in which enforcement would be "distinctly contrary to the basic
principles of the legal system of the country where the award was
invoked."' 2
The case law, however, is still sparse. As yet it is still quite pos-
sible to argue that the facts of the cases decided so far may not have
really tested how far the courts would be willing to go to enforce
foreign awards in situations where such enforcement would be in di-
rect and substantial conflict with fundamental domestic legal or
moral concepts or with statutes embodying such concepts. Moreover,
not only have the courts, and most particularly the United States
Supreme Court in its only decision on this point,10 3 left a number of
questions unanswered, they have also indicated and even explicitly
pointed out situations in which the question of enforcement would
require considerations other than those that have been necessary in
the cases decided to date. Consequently, it can fairly be inferred that
many issues still remain to be decided before it can be authorita-
tively concluded when the courts will deny enforcement of a foreign
arbitral award on the basis of the public policy provision of the New
York Convention and, underlying that, what the courts ultimately
will consider to be the "most basic notions of morality and justice."
102. See Committee's report of March 28, 1955, U.N. Doc. E/2704. Under the public
policy clause proposed by the Committee, enforcement could be refused if enforcement "would
be clearly incompatible with public policy or with fundamental principles of the law ('ordre
public') of the country in which the award [was] sought to be relied upon." (art. IV(h) of the
Committee's Draft Convention, reproduced in an annex to the said Committee report). The
clause was identical to the one embodied in the Geneva Convention, Art. le, except for the
fact that the Committee had added the words "clearly" and "fundamental" in order to limit
the application of the clause to situations where enforcement "would be distinctly contrary to
the basic principles of the legal system of the country where the award [was] invoked" (see
said Committee report, F. 49, at 13). As a result of the comments and suggestions made on the
Draft Convention by governments and non-governmental organizations, the reference to "fun-
damental principles of the law" was later omitted on the ground that the concept of public
policy was considered to be "a sufficiently broad criterion and that the additional requirements
of compatibility with fundamental principles of the law [could] give rise to difficulties of inter-
pretation and open the question of a revision of the award as to its substance." (U.N. Doc. E/
CONF 26/2, at 6-7).
103. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506. See also supra note 30 and accompa-
nying text.
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